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The Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial 
White-Collar Crime 
Andrew Spalding* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent reports of egregious labor practices in China and 
Bangladesh have called public attention to the potential harms of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. The best, 
or at least most obvious, tool for reducing destructive overseas 
business practices would seem to be the extraterritorial 
application of white-collar criminal law. 1  The ―holy grail‖ of 
contemporary criminal law is deterrence,2  and the deterrence 
literature is largely shaped by the paradigm of law and 
economics. Prominent within that literature is Polinsky and 
Shavell’s ―enforcement authority,‖ which seeks to maximize 
social utility through the efficient deterrence of crime.3 Guided by 
the principles of law and economics, the enforcement authority 
wields four enforcement tools: enforcement expenditures, the 
level of the fine, the length of imprisonment, and the standard for 
imposing liability. 4  By manipulating these variables, it can 
presumably achieve the optimal combination of minimizing crime 
while also minimizing public expense.5  
But this essay argues that, in international business law 
specifically, that enforcement authority will tend to fail. The 
traditional methods of criminal deterrence, when applied 
rigorously and in good faith, will ultimately create the very 
conditions in which extraterritorial white-collar crime 
proliferates. As the enforcement authority utilizes its tools to 
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 1 See, e.g., Jodie Gummow, In Bangladesh, Workers Escalate Demands for Better 
Working Conditions, TRUTHOUT (May 26, 2013, 9:52), http://www.truth-out.org/ 
news/item/16594-in-bangladesh-workers-escalate-demands-for-better-working-conditions. 
 2 Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of 
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 515 (2006). 
 3 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public 
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 72 (2000). 
 4 Id. at 49. 
 5 See id. at 70. 
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pursue the optimally low level of such crime, unique legal and 
economic conditions will too often produce an increase in overall 
rates of criminality. Deterrence’s goal—namely, the reduction in 
crime—can only be achieved by utilizing tools and theories that 
are not part of the contemporary deterrence logic.  
Section I briefly describes the law and economics approach to 
deterrence, and explains why scholars have not been particularly 
concerned with whether deterrence could lead to an increase, 
rather than a decrease, in crime. Section II then explains how 
international business, particularly foreign direct investment in 
developing countries, creates a set of conditions in which this 
possibility arises. It constructs a model, using bribery 
prohibitions as an example, which illustrates that beyond a given 
level of enforcement, heightened enforcement will produce a net 
increase in crime in the host country. Section III explores the 
possibility that corporate social responsibility (CSR) may be able 
to pick up where law and economics leaves off. That is, though 
crime reduction ultimately proves beyond the reach of the law 
and economics enforcement authority, it may be within the reach 
of socially responsible corporations. But inducing these 
corporations to more than mere compliance requires a 
reexamination of the basic assumptions on the relationship 
between CSR and globalization.  
I. THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE 
This section briefly discusses both the theoretical and 
empirical scholarship on how deterrence works. It then shows 
how little attention deterrence scholars have paid to the problem 
of overdeterrence. 
A. The Downside of Deterrence’s Upside  
Within the law and economics scholarship, the watershed 
work on public law enforcement was Polinsky and Shavell’s The 
Economic Theory of the Public Enforcement of Law.6 They explain 
that to the law and economics way of thinking, ―social welfare 
generally is presumed to equal the sum of individuals’ expected 
utilities.‖7 An individual’s expected utility essentially depends on 
four variables: whether she commits a harmful act, whether she 
is sanctioned (by fine, imprisonment, or both), whether she is a 
victim of someone else’s harmful act, and on her tax payment 
 
 6 See generally id.  
 7 Id. at 48.  
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(which will reflect the costs of law enforcement, less any fine 
revenue collected).8  
The individual thus wears two hats in the utility calculation: 
as potential wrongdoer, and as potential victim. The potential 
victim’s two variables—whether she is a victim, and the extent of 
her taxes—are of course closely interconnected. Recognizing her 
potential victimization, she pays taxes to prevent it. The purpose 
of paying taxes, then, is to prevent the disutility of victimization. 
The paradigm thus assumes that we pay taxes to increase our 
individual utility; were there no threat of victimization, the 
individual would have no reason to pay taxes. There would be no 
utility in it; not faced with the threatened disutility of falling 
victim, her utility would not be maximized by paying taxes to 
finance public criminal law enforcement. The potential victims 
are taxpayers; the taxpayers are potential victims.  
The ―enforcement authority’s problem‖ then is to maximize 
social welfare by finding the most efficient combination of the 
four key enforcement variables mentioned above: enforcement 
expenditures, the level of the fine, the length of imprisonment, 
and the standard for imposing liability.9 The disutility of crime is 
weighed against the cost of prevention, and the aim is to reduce 
crime with maximal cost-efficiency. The enforcement authority 
should expend only so much on enforcement as is necessary to 
reduce the disutility for the taxpayer. 
Following Beccaria’s admonition that ―[i]t is better to 
prevent crimes than to punish them,‖10 law and economics seeks 
to deter crime by ensuring that the cost of punishment to a 
potential wrongdoer exceeds the rewards.11 The core assumption 
of deterrence is that potential wrongdoers will decide against the 
commission of a criminal act based on the fear of sanctions or 
punishment. 12  It assumes that the potential (and perhaps 
hypothetical) wrongdoer calculates the utility of crime based on 
the benefits and costs of the criminal act as well as the benefits 
and costs of abstaining.13 The attributes of punishment that can 
be manipulated to maintain the proper cost-benefit ratio are its 
certainty, severity, and celerity (or swiftness). 14  If set 
 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id. at 49. 
 10 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 93 (Henry Paolucci trans., 6th 
prtg. 1977) (1764). 
 11 GEORGE B. VOLD, THOMAS J. BERNARD & JEFFREY B. SNIPES, THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 196 (5th ed. 2002). 
 12 Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 783. 
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appropriately, the potential violator will succumb to deterrence 
because a rational choice would never result in the commission of 
a crime; the cost would prove too high in comparison to the 
perceived benefit. 15  Thus, ―[p]unishment is said to have a 
deterrent effect when the fear or actual imposition of punishment 
leads to conformity.‖16 
This core theory has given rise to a number of hypotheses 
that empiricists continue to test. Questions remain concerning to 
what extent an increase in the objective costs of punishment to a 
potential wrongdoer, particularly length of sentence, will 
decrease the incidence of crime; to what extent increasing 
enforcement resources will increase certainty and celerity; 
whether objective increases in certainty, severity, or celerity will 
produce a proportional increase in the subjective perceptions of 
those attributes among wrongdoers and therefore exert a 
downward push on crime; etc.17 
But note that these are questions of degree. While we do not 
know whether deterrence ―works very well,‖18 we know it works. 
The empirical evidence indeed demonstrates that deterrence 
measures succeed—however imperfectly—in reducing crime. 19 
Actors subject to the jurisdiction of a law that penalizes a given 
form of conduct with the requisite degree of certainty, severity, 
and celerity will engage in less of that conduct. We know this, 
and we might call it the upside of deterrence. 
But notice the corollary. If we know that actors subject to a 
criminal prohibition will engage in less of that conduct, we also 
know that actors not so subject will engage in more of it. Applied 
to white-collar enforcement, companies subject to the criminal 
prohibition on a particular form of profitable but socially 
undesirable conduct will engage in less of that conduct than 
companies that are not so subject; companies not subject to that 
prohibition will engage, relatively speaking, in more of that 
conduct. This is the downside of deterrence’s upside. To clarify, 
what I am here calling the downside is not a consequence of its 
upside; it is merely a logical corollary that will prove important 
in the analysis below. And in international business, governed by 
the extraterritorial application of criminal laws, where the law’s 
 
 15 See VOLD ET AL., supra note 11, at 196. 
 16 TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG LU, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 20 (2005). Deterrence need not be complete; partial deterrence is still 
successful. Id. at 21. 
 17 See Paternoster, supra note 12, at 787–818. 
 18 Id. at 766; see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: 
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 9 (2009). 
 19 KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 10–11.  
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stated object is to deter overseas crime, the downside proves to be 
a tricky problem. 
B. The Nonissue of Criminal Overdeterrence 
Despite the robust theoretical and empirical deterrence 
literature, scholars have given little attention to the issue of 
criminal overdeterrence. In civil law, by contrast, the cost of 
overdeterrence is well recognized:20 if punishment for causing a 
car accident were $1 million, people would likely cease driving.21 
But for the kinds of intentional acts generally proscribed by 
criminal law, the risk of discouraging socially productive 
behavior, or of encouraging constructive behavior, is negligible. 
Because the goal is to achieve effective deterrence by setting 
punishment at a sufficiently high level to dissuade potential 
offenders, the ―temptation to impose increasingly harsher 
penalties is strong.‖22 The optimal level of intentional (as opposed 
to negligent) criminal conduct, generally speaking, is therefore 
zero. 
But scholars have, perhaps somewhat indirectly, addressed 
the problem of overdeterrence in two ways. These concern the 
risk that deterring a particular crime might increase the 
incidence of other crimes. The first is the problem of marginal 
deterrence: setting equally high penalties for crimes of unequal 
severity will tend to encourage the more severe crime. As George 
Stigler famously put it, ―If the thief has his hand cut off for 
taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.‖23 Where the 
overall level of criminality might be understood as the number of 
crimes committed multiplied by their severity, disproportionate 
penalties for relatively mild criminal acts will remove the 
disincentive to engage in more serious crimes and thus increase 
overall levels of criminality. 
The second is based on Neal Katyal’s research on 
substitution. Katyal held that the public enforcement agency 
must consider how penalizing a given crime may increase the 
appeal of alternative, or substitute, crimes. An increase in the 
 
 20 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 213–17 (8th ed. 2011) 
(describing the theory of optimal tort damages).  
 21 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and 
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1056 n.100 (2009). 
 22 Id. at 1055–56. The overdeterrence problem can arise with negligence crimes; 
negligent vehicular homicide would raise the same overdeterrence problems as the civil 
example above, such that the optimal level of such homicides may be greater than zero. 
Id. at 1056 (stating in the civil tort context ―the possibility of overdeterrence is a 
persistent problem‖); see also POSNER, supra note 20. 
 23 George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 
(1970). 
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―price‖ of one crime may cause potential wrongdoers to substitute 
criminal act X with criminal act Y or Z.24 Accordingly, though 
enforcing the prohibition on X may well deter X, it may also 
increase the incidence of Y or Z.25 For both of these problems, the 
effort to deter a given crime has produced the collateral harm of 
an increase in another form of crime. 
But for these costs, scholars have not seemed particularly 
concerned about the collateral economic harm of deterring 
criminal behavior. But contemporary international white-collar 
enforcement may present new challenges to the logic of 
deterrence. Despite deterrence’s relatively long history, 
originating in the eighteenth-century works of Montesquieu,26 
Beccaria,27 and Bentham,28 the concept fell out of fashion and 
was largely neglected29 until the seminal work of Gary Becker in 
the 1960s.30 And owing largely to Cold War ideological divisions, 
international business—and particularly the flow of capital from 
developed to developing countries—would not increase 
significantly until after the collapse of communism. As will be 
shown below, this new economic order raises significant 
theoretical and practical problems for deterrence.  
II. THE CRIMOGENICS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL WHITE-COLLAR 
ENFORCEMENT 
Extraterritorial conduct of any sort raises formidable law 
enforcement challenges: evidence is difficult to collect, foreign 
enforcement authorities may not be cooperative or well 
resourced, and cultural sensitivities must be navigated. But this 
article argues that the challenges of extraterritorial white-collar 
 
 24 Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2387 (1997). 
 25 The enforcement authority’s inclination to inflict an increasingly severe 
punishment may be further restrained in two ways. Bronsteen et al., supra note 21, at 
1056. First, the enforcement costs must be no greater than is necessary to achieve the 
optimal level of deterrence. Id. These costs would take two forms. Id. Most obvious are the 
costs of ―detecting, trying, and imprisoning a criminal,‖ which are of course substantial. 
Id. Under the logic of deterrence they cannot become excessively so, lest the taxpayers’ 
disutility exceeds the risk of victimization. Id. But additionally, society incurs the 
opportunity cost of removing potentially productive individuals from society through 
imprisonment, a factor that is (from a narrowly economic perspective) especially 
pronounced in white-collar crime. Id. In addition to these social costs, utilitarianism 
would value the welfare (though not the rights) of the defendant; he need not suffer any 
greater a punishment than is necessary for deterrence purposes. Id. at 1056–57. 
 26 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., 
Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1748). 
 27 See BECCARIA, supra note 10, at 58. 
 28 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789). 
 29 Paternoster, supra note 12, at 772–73. 
 30 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
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deterrence run far deeper. By definition, many or most actors 
committing crimes in foreign jurisdictions are not subject to the 
same set of disincentives: companies seeking to extract Nigeria’s 
oil will hail from the United States, the EU, Russia, China, and 
elsewhere, and these countries will have substantially different 
white-collar crime regimes in place. The United States, for 
example, may be able to deter socially destructive behavior 
among U.S. companies and other companies subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction, but it cannot readily alter the behavior of those 
companies that lie beyond its jurisdiction. To the extent that a 
country wishes to reduce criminal conduct in overseas locations 
where only a portion of all actors is subject to its jurisdiction, this 
becomes problematic. 
Of course, it may well be true that in certain areas of law the 
aim is not to reduce the overall levels of a given sort of 
extraterritorial crime. We may wish only to deter the conduct 
among our own citizens, perhaps untroubled by the impact our 
own deterrence efforts may have on overall levels of criminality 
in those foreign locations. But other areas of law, such as 
anti-bribery law, prohibit the overseas conduct categorically, 
without regard to whether the conduct has any harmful impact 
whatsoever on U.S. markets or persons. 
This section shows just how problematic that goal will prove 
to be. It develops a model that illustrates how, given current and 
foreseeable future legal and economic conditions, extraterritorial 
deterrence has pronounced crimogenic31 tendencies. That is, in 
attempting to reduce crime overseas, wielding the tools of 
deterrence will often create the conditions in which the conduct 
we seek to deter actually proliferates. 
A. Three Unique Conditions of International Business 
Foreign direct investment, particularly in developing 
countries, has three inherent characteristics that distinguish it 
from the domestic conduct that deterrence scholarship generally 
assumes. In combination, they create a kind of perfect storm in 
which deterrence will often prove self-defeating. 
The first I will call ―selective criminalization.‖ A given form 
of extraterritorial conduct may well be criminalized by a 
particular home jurisdiction: think of express statutory 
prohibitions on overseas bribery or monopolistic conduct in the 
 
 31 For a discussion of crimogenics in deterrence, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst 
When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 985–89 (2003); see also KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 
54–72. 
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United States, and the dedication of substantial resources to 
their enforcement. But other countries may fall into either of two 
alternative categories: those that do not enforce their 
prohibitions, and those that have not enacted such prohibitions. 
In other words, among all actors in a given foreign jurisdiction, 
the conduct is only selectively criminalized: the criminal 
prohibition applies to some of the companies pursuing Nigerian 
oil, but not to others. The United States may wish to deter 
bribery there, but lacks jurisdiction over many of the actors. 
The second characteristic I will call the ―discretionary 
investment forum.‖ A typical U.S.-based company will be doing 
business in the United States. The enforcement authority thus 
need not worry whether that company will choose to continue 
doing business there (unless, of course, a given criminal 
prohibition threatens to drive a company out of business 
altogether, but this is rare and probably confined to highly 
dubious business models). But overseas investment forums are 
inherently discretionary: a U.S.-based company may choose to 
focus its efforts in the United States, or to enter overseas 
markets, and if the latter, to focus on the developed or developing 
world, and to invest in particular countries. These countries will 
vary in their legal, economic, and cultural environments, 
potentially creating varying levels of risk that a U.S.-based 
company will engage in conduct that its home jurisdiction 
criminalizes. Accordingly, the enforcement authority must 
consider whether its companies will do business in these 
jurisdictions at all. When the enforcement authority uses the 
tools of deterrence to raise the costs of a particular behavior, the 
costs may rise to a level where, in certain contexts, the risk 
becomes too great. Companies may then use their discretion not 
to invest in particular projects, sectors, or countries. The effort to 
deter crime has thus deterred investment. 
Should the enforcement authority care? The question goes to 
the very heart of the law and economics methodology. Richard 
Posner has characterized law as ―a system for maximizing the 
wealth of society.‖32 The aim of enforcement is thus to increase 
wealth, for individual persons and for society generally. The 
deterrence of investment in foreign countries has implications for 
both. Companies may forego relatively efficient investment 
opportunities for safer, but less efficient (and profitable) 
opportunities. This, in turn, impacts the wealth of both the 
capital-exporting and the capital-importing nation: the exporter’s 
GDP is negatively impacted by the diminished profits of its 
 
 32 See POSNER, supra note 20, at 32.  
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companies; and the importer’s GDP is negatively impacted by the 
loss of foreign direct investment. If deterrence is understood as 
one of many mechanisms for increasing social wealth, deterring 
investment in particular discretionary investment forums is 
problematic. This becomes especially true in developing countries 
where the need to maximize wealth is most pressing. 
The third characteristic I will call ―investor substitution.‖ 
Assume, for purposes of this theory, that the companies from 
diverse jurisdictions are interchangeable—that companies from 
the United States, Germany, and China are equally capable of 
providing the given good or service. This is of course not true in 
all industries; highly technologically sophisticated sectors, for 
example, will tend to favor companies from more developed 
countries. But the gap is narrowing as developing countries like 
China progress, and the gap does not exist at all for many or 
most industries. Further assume that the host country’s need for 
FDI is constant, such that if companies originating from one 
jurisdiction are disinclined to do business in the manner 
expected by the host country, that host country will seek the 
investment from other jurisdictions. Given these assumptions, 
quasi-criminalization and the discretionary investment forum 
will result in investor substitution. Companies from a country 
that enforces a given criminal prohibition—again, think of the 
United States enforcing a bribery prohibition—may find the risk 
(say, of paying bribes in Nigeria) too high. Those companies may 
choose not to invest in countries like Nigeria (as ample empirical 
evidence demonstrates).33  The host country, which remains in 
need of the FDI, will seek it from companies that are from 
jurisdictions that do not enforce the prohibition. Because these 
companies can provide roughly the same good or service—in 
other words, the substitution costs to the host country are 
negligible—they will become substitute foreign investors. 
This analysis is related to, but significantly different from, 
the previous work on substitution. That body of scholarship, as 
noted above, has focused on a given actor substituting criminal 
acts Y and Z for criminal act X. It assumed a given set of actors, 
choosing among alternative forms of criminality. The principle of 
investor substitution is quite different. It assumes alternative 
actors are all deciding whether to engage in the same form of 
criminality (or, to be clear, conduct that one jurisdiction deems 
criminal, though others do not). It is a variation on the 
 
 33 For a summary of the empirical literature, see Andrew Brady Spalding, 
Corruption, Corporations, and the New Human Right, 89 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232670. 
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substitution thesis that applies uniquely to the realm of 
extraterritorial enforcement. 
B. The Net Impact on Crime: An Illustration 
The impact of investor substitution on the net levels of crime 
in the host country will depend on the level of enforcement. This 
section illustrates how a relatively low level of enforcement can 
reduce overall crime, but increases in enforcement will, 
ironically, increase levels of criminality. This model uses anti-
bribery law to illustrate this dynamic. 
This paper does not assume the existence of a perfectly 
rational enforcement authority. Rather than exploring what a 
hypothetical authority should do, it explores the implications of 
what actual governments would do or have done. It posits a 
number of conditions that closely resemble the actual world of 
anti-bribery enforcement, and which would likely be typical of 
other areas of extraterritorial white-collar criminal enforcement 
as well. Such an enforcement authority is, predictably, 
economically subrational in several important respects. 
First, the enforcement authority assumes that the optimal 
level of bribery is zero, and does not engage in sophisticated 
arguments about whether some amount of bribery may actually 
be efficient. This assumption holds true both for bribery among 
companies subject to its jurisdiction, and for overall levels of 
bribery in the host countries as well. Alternatively, one might 
assume that the enforcement authority is guided by a 
deontological argument—that bribery is inherently wrong—
rather than an assumption about the relationship between 
bribery and economic efficiency. Either way, the authority is 
determined to reduce bribery as far as possible. 
Second, and relatedly, the agencies of the enforcement 
authority that enforce the bribery prohibition will actually take 
measures to deter bribery without regard for their impact on 
economic efficiency. Whatever they may have assumed about the 
relationship between bribery and efficiency, the statute charges 
the agencies with reducing bribery and makes no mention of its 
economic implications. 
Third, the enforcement authority is unwilling or unable to 
impose a combination of enforcement expenditures and level of 
penalty that would immediately reduce bribery to zero. It is faced 
with limited enforcement resources, uncertain political support, 
and imperfect empirical knowledge about the effects of 
enforcement on crime. Similarly, it likely subscribes to notions of 
fairness that will prevent it from imposing the exorbitant 
Do Not Delete 2/25/2014 8:34 PM 
2014] Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial White-Collar Crime 365 
penalties that could deter bribery where the probability of 
detection was more limited. Thus constrained, the enforcement 
authority experiments with varying levels of enforcement over 
time (which is precisely what has occurred in the United 
States).34 Accordingly, the illustration below posits a recognizably 
subrational enforcement authority, and uses law and economics 
principles to trace out the implications of that authority’s 
enforcement decisions. 
Assume, then, a developing country (the ―host country‖) that 
solicits foreign direct investment in its infrastructure sector. In 
this country and sector, bribery is quite common. Further assume 
that companies from two jurisdictions—Jurisdiction A and 
Jurisdiction B—have historically invested in this sector. 35  All 
firms competing in the host country’s infrastructure sector are 
from one of these jurisdictions; no companies from jurisdictions 
other than A or B are investing there. 
The host country will regularly issue Requests For Proposals 
(RFPs) and companies will submit bids in an effort to win 
contracts. Each contract involves a variety of transactions in 
which bribes would typically be paid: some would be paid during 
the bidding process (preparing and submitting the bid, then 
winning the contract) and others would be paid in the course of 
performing the contract (visas, permits, inspections, etc.). 
Further assume that the number of transactions per contract is 
fixed, resulting in a fixed number of total transactions. For 
purposes of this argument, assume that 100% of all business 
transactions in the host country government have involved 
bribes.  
At a time that we shall call Time 1, neither Jurisdiction A 
nor Jurisdiction B is enforcing an extraterritorial bribery 
prohibition. Firms from both A and B therefore pay bribes freely. 
But Jurisdiction A firms are more efficient than Jurisdiction B 
firms, such that A firms in Time 1 win 60% of the contracts and 
B firms win 40%. The chart below captures these numbers. 
 
 
 34 Id. at 7–10. 
 35 I use ―jurisdiction‖ rather than ―country‖ because often the jurisdiction of a given 
country will extend to companies from other countries as well. For example, certain 
foreign companies are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. extraterritorial anti-bribery 
statute, such that even though they do not reside in the United States, they are 
nevertheless ―from‖ the U.S. jurisdiction. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/guide.pdf. 
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Time Enforcement 
Level 
% Market 
Share for Firms 
from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes that 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
 
Firms from Jurisdiction A win 60% of the contracts, but pay 
bribes in 100% of the transactions. Jurisdiction B firms thus 
have a 40% market share, and likewise bribe 100% of the time. 
The overall rate of bribery in the infrastructure sector of the host 
country is therefore 100% in Time 1. 
However, at Time 2, Jurisdiction A announces that it will 
begin enforcing an extraterritorial criminal bribery prohibition. 
The enforcement agencies are, again, subrational actors, so they 
are unable to implement an enforcement regime that would 
reduce bribery to zero: they cannot dedicate the resources 
necessary to raise the probability of detection to the requisite 
level, and fairness principles do not allow them to impose 
exorbitant penalties that would compensate for the low level of 
detection. Constrained as they are by limited resources and by 
fairness, they commence what we will call a low level of 
enforcement. Jurisdiction B does not follow suit and does not 
implement any kind of extraterritorial bribery prohibition, so B 
firms continue to bribe freely.  
The host country issues a new set of RFPs and awards all 
available contracts to firms from Jurisdictions A and B. 
Jurisdiction A firms now become what we will call reluctant bribe 
payers. They do not stop paying bribes altogether, but they begin 
searching for ways to avoid paying bribes where possible while 
remaining present in the sector and profitable. While they may 
have previously paid a small bribe to expedite a visa approval, 
they are now willing to wait; instead of paying a bribe to send 
their goods immediately through customs, their ships wait in line 
for days in the harbor. Similarly, the government of Jurisdiction 
A begins working on behalf of its companies to reduce the 
demand for bribery in the host country (as the U.S. and UK 
governments do today).  
The reluctant bribe payers (companies from Jurisdiction A) 
recognize that avoiding bribes will often reduce their efficiency— 
waiting in the harbor for customs approval is not without cost to 
the company. But they are willing to absorb these costs to reduce 
the risk of penalty for violating the prohibition. Although the risk 
of penalty is high enough to deter a certain amount of bribery, it 
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is not high enough to completely stop paying bribes. For 
reluctant bribe payers, the benefits of continuing to invest in the 
host country remain high enough that the company can pay some 
bribes and accept the risk that it will be caught and penalized for 
violating the bribery prohibition.  
In the course of continuing to do business in the host 
country, the reluctant bribe payer will therefore encounter three 
kinds of transactions. The first is where the risk of detection is 
sufficiently high (or the firm is sufficiently principled) that it 
refuses to pay the bribe but can still find ways to complete the 
transaction. These may entail increased costs for the firm (such 
as waiting in line at port) but owing to the firm’s efficiency (or 
the less than perfectly competitive market conditions) the firm 
can absorb these costs while remaining profitable. Alternatively, 
the firm may seek the diplomatic assistance of the governments 
(in the United States, these would be the Departments of 
Commerce or State). This is the kind of conduct that anti-bribery 
advocates seek to incentivize and may generally assume occurs. 
However, the firm will encounter a second kind of bribe, in which 
it will likewise refuse to pay but cannot complete the transaction 
without it. The firm must therefore knowingly forego the 
transaction; the best example would be a lost bid in a RFP. For 
the third kind of bribe, the risk of detection may be sufficiently 
low, or the costs of foregoing the transaction are sufficiently high 
(the company really needs this particular bid, or cannot afford to 
wait three days in port) that the firm will pay the bribe and 
accept the risk of detection.36  
Given the three types of bribes the firm will encounter and 
Jurisdiction A’s new but still low-level of enforcement, assume 
that A firms reduce their bribery by half. They are now willing to 
pay bribes in 50% of all transactions. Assume further that as a 
result, the percentage of contracts they will be able to win also 
drops by half, from 60% of all contracts to 30% of all contracts. 
Investor substitution occurs, and B firms win the extra 30% of 
the contracts. Now A firms have 30% of the market and B firms 
have 70%. Owing to the downside of deterrence’s upside, B firms 
 
 36 The ability of companies from Jurisdiction A to absorb a degree of lost profits but 
remain competitive assumes that the market is not what economists would consider 
perfectly competitive. Were it so, the companies would have no margin to absorb the 
losses because competitors would have already been selling at the lower cost. But foreign 
direct investment is not perfectly competitive, in at least two respects. First, often a sort 
of oligopoly exists where only select companies from select countries are positioned to 
compete. Second, some companies might have a competitive advantage by virtue of their 
access to capital, technological, or various forms of government support. Accordingly, this 
illustration assumes that Jurisdiction A firms are operating at a level of profitability that 
permits them to absorb limited losses to comply with the statute. 
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continue to bribe in 100% of all their transactions, and therefore 
will bribe on the extra 30% of the contracts they will win. But 
because A firms were paying bribes on those contracts in Time 1, 
investor substitution has not resulted in a net increase in bribery 
in the host country. 
Rather, A’s low level of enforcement has thus succeeded in 
two respects. Of the 30% of the contracts that A firms win, they 
will only pay bribes in 50% of these transactions. For half of this 
30%, or 15%, no bribes are being paid; this portion of the host 
country’s infrastructure sector is now clean. Jurisdiction A’s 
enforcement has thus reduced bribery among its own firms by 
50%, and has reduced net bribery levels in the host country by 
15%. 
 
Time Enforcement 
Level 
% Market 
Share for Firms 
from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes that 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
T2 Low 30 50 85 
 
Again, overall levels of bribery have gone down from 100% to 
85% because A firms have a 30% market share and are not 
paying bribes on half of the related transactions. This is the 
outcome that anti-bribery advocates take for granted, and for 
those who accept the normative premise that federal law should 
deter overseas bribery, it is the reason to continue enforcement. 
But now assume a subsequent point in time, called Time 3. 
The enforcement authorities in Jurisdiction A, perhaps 
encouraged from the successes of Time 2, have decided to ramp 
up enforcement through the dedication of new resources. We will 
call this mid-level enforcement, and it significantly increases the 
likelihood of detecting violations. In Time 3, the host country 
issues a new set of RFPs. The other assumptions still hold: the 
total number of transactions is again fixed, companies from 
Jurisdictions A and B will again compete, and companies from 
Jurisdiction B still bribe without fear of punishment. 
Companies from Jurisdiction A now engage in a new 
cost-benefit analysis. They conclude that because the risk of 
detection and therefore penalty is higher, they must pay even 
fewer bribes than they did in Time 2. Say that mid-level 
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enforcement induces A firms to reduce their bribery percentage 
from 50% to 25% of all transactions.  
The mid-level enforcement regime has thus succeeded in 
reducing bribery among companies subject to its jurisdiction. But 
consider the impact that investor substitution will now have on 
the change in overall bribery levels from Time 2 to Time 3. 
Although A firms won 60% of all contracts when bribing 100% of 
the time, they can now win only one-fourth of those contracts.37 
They now have only a 15% market share, down from 30% in Time 
2. The 15% market share that A firms have lost since Time 2 will 
now go to B firms, which continue to bribe 100% of the time. In 
other words, 15% of the transactions have shifted from reluctant 
bribe payers to free bribe payers. Jurisdiction A firms remain 
engaged in only 15% of all transactions in the host country’s 
infrastructure sector, and they will pay bribes in one-fourth of 
that 15%. Accordingly, A firms are bribe-free in 11% of all 
transactions. Because all other transactions are paid with bribes, 
the overall bribery level in the host country is now at 89%. 
 
Time Enforcement 
Level 
% Market 
Share for Firms 
from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes that 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
T2 Low 30 50 85 
T3 Mid 15 25 89 
 
From Time 2, overall bribery has increased by 4%, and the 
increase is entirely due to Jurisdiction A’s increased enforcement 
effort.  
Consider a further period in time, Time 4, in which 
Jurisdiction A has finally resolved to dedicate the enforcement 
resources necessary to achieve what it deems the optimal rate of 
bribery among its firms—0%. And suppose it succeeds, such that 
now A firms pay absolutely no bribes. Further assume that all 
other conditions remain the same, and the host country issues a 
new set of RFPs. Jurisdiction A firms can no longer win contracts 
 
 37 This exercise assumes that the percentage of contracts it can win will drop 
precisely in the same amount as the percentage of bribes it can pay. In practice, the 
relationship between these two figures would be more complicated. 
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in this host country’s infrastructure sector. Jurisdiction B firms 
now win 100% of the contracts, engage in 100% of the 
transactions, and pay bribes 100% of the time. While the rate of 
bribery among A firms is now 0%, the overall rate of bribery in 
the host country is 100%.  
 
Time Enforcement 
Level 
% Market 
Share for Firms 
from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes that 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
T2 Low 30 50 85 
T3 Mid 15 25 89 
T4 High 0 0 100 
 
Notice the pattern. At Time 2, its efforts to deter bribery 
were effective in reducing the overall level of bribery in the host 
country. The success was due to raising the risk of detection and 
penalty to the point that its companies would make an effort to 
bribe less, but could still do business. Companies from 
Jurisdiction A indeed lost business as a result of the decision to 
enforce the bribery prohibition. But in Time 1, companies from 
Jurisdiction A were bribing as freely as companies from 
Jurisdiction B, so losing business to companies from Jurisdiction 
B at Time 2 did not result in an increase in bribery for the host 
country. The enforcement authority from Jurisdiction A thus 
continues to believe that increasing enforcement will decrease 
bribery. But at Time 3, the second increase in enforcement has 
reduced bribery only among companies subject to A’s jurisdiction. 
Those companies are indeed bribing less. But owing to investor 
substitution, the impact on overall levels of bribery in the host 
country is a net increase. And we saw at Time 4 that raising 
penalty risks further can produce a scenario in which the rates of 
bribery in the host country return to 100%, a level not seen since 
before the enforcement effort began. In sum, after Time 1, the 
overall rate of bribery in the host country correlates inversely 
with Jurisdiction A’s enforcement. Likewise, it correlates 
inversely with the percentage of bribes that A firms are paying. 
As Jurisdiction A attempts, and succeeds, in decreasing bribery 
among its own companies, it increases overall bribery in the 
developing country. 
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This illustration is of course artificially simplified. In reality, 
a number of additional variables would influence the net impact 
of increased enforcement: the number of transactions, the 
number of agencies or persons soliciting bribes, changes in the 
level of penalty, changes in the effectiveness of the reluctant 
bribe payer’s tools for avoiding bribes, and perhaps most 
importantly, a decrease in the percentage of transactions in 
developing countries that require bribes. Developing a model that 
considers each of these variables is a project for another day. But 
this thought experiment nevertheless illustrates limitations 
inherent in the effort to deter extraterritorial white-collar crime, 
given current global economic and legal conditions. 
C. Deterrence’s Double Disutility  
Though the enforcement authority’s aim is to maximize 
utility, extraterritorial white-collar deterrence will tend to 
produce two distinct forms of disutility. 
The first is, quite simply, that it often will not work. As 
explained above, overseas business environments will often lead 
to an increase, rather than a decrease, in the conduct we seek to 
deter. This will be true as long as capital-exporting jurisdictions 
vary in their enactment and enforcement of criminal 
prohibitions. The answer, one might think, is to tinker with the 
variables available to the enforcement authority: enforcement 
expenditures, fine levels, the length of imprisonment, and the 
standard for imposing liability. The problem, however, is that 
once into Time 2, decreasing the cost of the penalty through any 
of these four variables will necessarily decrease the disincentive 
to engage in the act: reducing enforcement expenditures, fines, or 
prison terms, or raising the standard for imposing liability, will 
decrease the costs of crime and increase its frequency. 
In Times 2 and 3, the enforcement authority is trapped. By 
not increasing the risk of detection, it tolerates a measure of 
criminality among persons subject to its jurisdiction. But by 
raising the risk of detection, it produces the concurrent decrease 
in criminality among its companies, and an increase in that same 
behavior in the host country among all actors. These are the 
Scylla and Charybdis of extraterritorial white-collar criminal 
enforcement. The enforcement authority must choose between 
the harm of knowingly tolerating preventable criminality among 
its own companies, and knowingly increasing levels of criminality 
in vulnerable developing countries. It cannot avoid both. 
But even if the first problem were resolved, and overseas 
deterrence efforts were to effectively reduce crime, the law and 
economics enforcement authority would be left with a second 
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problem. Consider again the assumption behind the economic 
theory of public enforcement: the taxpayer is the potential victim, 
and she pays taxes to prevent her victimization. That works in 
domestic enforcement, where all potential victims are taxpayers 
and all taxpayers are potential victims. But what if the victims 
are not taxpayers, and the taxpayers are not victims? What if the 
victims lie beyond the jurisdiction that is enforcing the criminal 
prohibition, and are therefore not paying the taxes that fund 
enforcement? Again using the anti-bribery example, we devote 
substantial public resources to protecting those overseas victims 
through the DOJ, SEC, FBI, offices in Commerce and State, and 
the federal judiciary. And various economic benefits might very 
well accrue to U.S. taxpayers, including the improvement of 
overseas markets and the resulting potential for economic and 
political alliances. But stakeholders to anti-bribery enforcement 
generally agree that the principal victims of extraterritorial 
bribery are the citizens of the overseas governments. And they 
are not paying for enforcement. That is, Congress enacted a 
statute in which U.S. taxpayers would pay to protect 
non-taxpayers from the harms of bribery. To the 
utility-maximizing taxpayer typically associated with law and 
economics, this is the second disutility of deterrence. 
The enforcement authority thus seeks the Golden Mean or, if 
one prefers, the Goldilocks theory, of enforcement: to enforce its 
prohibition only to the point that it deters overall levels of 
bribery, and not further. The law and economics enforcement 
authority is trapped in this dilemma, unable to achieve what it 
considers the optimal level of criminality among its own actors 
without raising levels of the same conduct in the host country. 
To the extent that the extraterritorial prohibition seeks both 
to deter criminality among the jurisdiction’s own actors and to 
reduce overall levels of crime, the traditional mechanisms of 
deterrence may not be the most effective tools available. That is, 
the means typically employed by deterrence advocates may not 
be best suited to achieve deterrence’s goals. Rather, the 
achievement of deterrence goals may require using 
non-deterrence, or extra-deterrence, means. 
As the above illustration shows, extraterritorial crime 
reduction requires reaching two sets of actors who lie beyond the 
reach of the enforcement authority. The first is the host country: 
to the extent that a capital-importing country can enforce its own 
prohibitions (on bribery, for instance) no investor substitution 
can occur. All companies investing in that country would (in 
theory) be subject to the same risks and costs, and would engage 
in crime at roughly similar levels. If the host country sought to 
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reduce a given form of conduct to zero, it could do so, and 
differences among the capital-exporting jurisdictions would 
become irrelevant. But a developing country, almost by 
definition, is ill-equipped to do so; its state is not yet sufficiently 
resourced to deter the conduct of powerful foreign firms. This is 
thus a long-term project. Accordingly, the capital-exporting 
jurisdiction seeking to deter destructive conduct in foreign 
countries can also seek to influence the behavior of competing 
capital-exporting jurisdictions that do not enforce comparable 
prohibitions (the B Jurisdictions). The problem, of course, is that 
the enforcing jurisdictions (the A Jurisdictions) generally have no 
authority over either the capital-importing or capital-exporting 
governments. 
III. RETHINKING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
The challenge of extraterritorial crime reduction is to 
promote better overseas conduct using tools other than, or in 
addition to, the coercive power of the state. The above illustration 
shows how mere compliance by firms subject to an enforcing 
jurisdiction will tend to create an environment in which those 
firms cannot compete: eventually, high levels of enforcement 
combined with investor substitution will chase them out of the 
market. From the company’s own standpoint, then, compliance 
proves self-defeating. But where the risk of detection is 
sufficiently high, noncompliance is not the remedy; this too will 
prove self-defeating. The remedy lies in doing that which law 
does not, and perhaps could not, require: firms subject to such 
extraterritorial prohibitions must seek to change the behavior of 
competitor firms, and push for reforms in capital-importing 
governments. 
Enter corporate social responsibility, which generally 
encourages firms to engage in socially beneficial conduct beyond 
the minimal requirements of compliance.38 This is especially true 
in the face of globalization, where ―the capacity of the state to 
regulate economic behavior and to set the conditions for market 
exchange is in decline.‖ 39  CSR scholars have argued that 
globalization requires corporations to ―go beyond what is 
 
 38 Given the mind-boggling array of proffered definitions of CSR, this article 
attempts none. For a sample, see Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9, 9 
(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). 
 39 Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Globalization and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 413, 
426 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008). 
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required by law, when the legal system is imperfect or legal rules 
are incomplete.‖40 
But the CSR literature ―has only begun to discuss the 
consequences of globalization,‖ 41  and has yet to tackle the 
difficult problems of extraterritorial deterrence given the reality 
of selective criminalization and investor substitution. While some 
scholars have suggested that ―creative compliance‖ is the ―most 
intractable‖ of ―obstacles to effective legal control of business,‖42 
the above deterrence analysis shows that the problem of 
corporate misbehavior is far greater than merely ensuring that 
firms obey the law to which they are subject. Jurisdiction A may 
draft a perfect statute, utterly devoid of loopholes and sufficiently 
expansive to include all conceivable forms of socially destructive 
behavior, and yet still fail to deter. Indeed, it may actually cause 
an increase in the proscribed conduct. CSR, accordingly, must do 
more than encourage firms to fully comply with the law in both 
its letter and ―spirit.‖ It must provide firms with a paradigm that 
induces them to systematically work toward altering the conduct 
of actors other than themselves. It is an other-regarding form of 
CSR that focuses not on the victims, but on potential wrongdoers 
whose home jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to deter 
destructive behavior. It must further persuade firms that the 
socially responsible thing is closely aligned with their interests 
and motivations. 
The existing literature on CSR and globalization has not 
provided this paradigm. That literature has generally envisioned 
any or all of three forms of socially responsible corporate conduct 
with respect to developing countries. The first appeals to the 
firm’s profit motive. It argues that various forms of socially 
beneficial conduct, while not immediately profitable, will tend to 
prove profitable in the long term. Indeed, it may have become 
―conventional wisdom for management texts and CSR advocates‖ 
to claim that considering ―a broad range of stakeholders is in a 
firm’s best long-term interests.‖43 This is sometimes called the 
―business case‖ for CSR, holding that companies can ―do well by 
 
 40 Id. at 414. 
 41 Id. at 422. 
 42 See McBarnet, supra note 38, at 48.   
 43 David L. Levy & Rami Kaplan, Corporate Social Responsibility and Theories of 
Global Governance: Strategic Contestation in Global Issue Arenas, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 433, 435 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 
2008) (citing ANNE T. LAWRENCE & JAMES WEBER, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: 
STAKEHOLDERS, ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY 21 (13th ed. 2004)). 
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doing good.‖44 The business case hypothesis has been subject to 
rigorous empirical tests over the years, but the results have 
proven unpersuasive.45 Some have thus concluded that ―a solid 
business case cannot be built by depending solely on locating an 
irrefutably established causal connection‖ between CSR and 
financial performance. 46  The link is simply too remote and 
tenuous. 
Accordingly, other forms of CSR in the globalization context 
appeal to other corporate motives and modes of operation. The 
second form of CSR is philanthropy, whereby the firm functions 
as a charitable donor. In developing countries, CSR frequently 
takes the form of investment in education, health, the 
environment, or other community services.47 While a firm may 
well have mixed motives in its charitable undertakings, this form 
of CSR seeks to move beyond the short-term profit motive in 
encouraging socially responsible behavior. 
Yet a third form of CSR frames the corporation not as a 
self-interested profit seeker but as a citizen, as a responsible 
contributing member of the polity. It holds that particularly in 
developing countries, where the host state is less effective and 
the regime of transnational rules is ―fragile and incomplete,‖ 
firms have a ―political responsibility to contribute to the 
development and proper working of global governance.‖48 These 
scholars argue that corporations must become ―politicized‖ 
through an ―enlarged understanding of responsibility‖ to ―solve 
political problems in cooperation with state actors and civil 
society actors.‖ 49  They should adopt more ―cosmopolitan or 
higher-order interests.‖50 These scholars envision CSR as part of 
a process in which ―political solutions for societal challenges are 
no longer limited to the political system but have become 
 
 44 Elizabeth C. Kurucz, Barry A. Colbert & David Wheeler, The Business Case for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 83, 84 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008). 
 45 See, e.g., Philip L. Cochran & Robert A. Wood, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Financial Performance, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 42, 42–56 (1984); Samuel B. Graves & 
Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional Owners and Corporate Social Performance, 37 ACAD. OF 
MGMT. J. 1034, 1042–44 (1994); James E. Mattingly & Shawn L. Berman, Measurement of 
Corporate Social Action: Discovering Taxonomy in the Kinder Lydenburg Domini Ratings 
Data, 45 BUS. & SOC’Y 20, 40–42 (2006).  
 46 Kurucz et al., supra note 44, at 85. 
 47 Wayne Visser, Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 473, 493 (Andrew Crane et al. 
eds., 2008). 
 48 Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 39, at 414. 
 49 Id. at 426. 
 50 Id. at 427 (citing Hildy Teegan, Jonathan P. Doh & Sushil Vachani, The 
Importance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance and Value, 
35 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUD. 463, 471 (2004)). 
Do Not Delete 2/25/2014 8:34 PM 
376 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 17:2 
embedded in decentralized processes that include non-state 
actors such as NGOs and corporations.‖ 51  Ultimately, by this 
view, corporations must be understood as both ―economic and 
political actors.‖52 
Note the relationship here between economic and political 
action. This model expressly makes a distinction between the 
conventional economic motives of a multinational corporation, 
and the ―higher-order‖ political motives. This form of CSR asks 
firms to transcend profit seeking in the name of citizenship. It 
posits a sharp dichotomy between the firm’s short-term economic 
interests and society’s longer-term interests.53 
Notably, so too does the charity model rest on this 
distinction. It calls upon firms to build social infrastructure 
through donations that, with the possible exception of tax 
benefits, are generally a chink to the bottom line. Finally, notice 
that even the so-called business case concedes the tension 
between foreseeable profits and socially responsible conduct. It 
has historically built its case not on foreseeable profits, but on 
long-term profit, and asked (or hoped) that the empiricists could 
prove the connection. This empirical proof was sought, of course, 
because the connection between CSR and profit was not 
immediately apparent. Like the charity and political actor 
models, the business case asks the firm to set aside short-term 
interests in the name of a longer-term—and, it seems, elusive—
financial benefit. 
But this distinction—between short-term economic interests 
and long-term social interests—is precisely the reason that so 
many doubt whether CSR can ever do much work. To the extent 
that corporations are asked to suspend or compromise their 
pursuit of profits, we wonder whether CSR’s impact will expand 
beyond the fringes. CSR’s prospects would indeed be far greater 
in a set of legal and economic conditions that made the 
connection between socially beneficial conduct and immediate 
profits more apparent. 
Those circumstances now exist in the arena of foreign direct 
investment in developing countries. The above analysis has 
shown that only up to a point will developed countries’ efforts to 
reduce overall levels of extraterritorial crime actually work. 
Given the unique conditions of selective criminality and investor 
substitution, strict compliance with an ever-increasing 
 
 51 Id. at 427. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 707 (2002). 
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enforcement effort poses an immediate threat to the profitability 
of companies from enforcing jurisdictions. Companies from 
non-enforcing jurisdictions will eventually chase them out of the 
market. Companies will see—and indeed, in the bribery space 
they increasingly report 54 —that enforcement and compliance 
significantly compromise their profitability. 
In this space arises the need for a new kind of CSR. Like the 
third model above, it would call on corporations to work toward 
political reforms in the countries in which they do business. It 
would indeed ask them to assume the role of a responsible 
citizen, and help to ensure that not just they, but others as well, 
are subject to meaningful laws that are effectively enforced. It 
would help to create the conditions that give rise to a 
broad-based culture of compliance. But in acting as citizen, this 
form of CSR would not ask the corporation to suspend its pursuit 
of profit, even of foreseeable and relatively short-term profit. It 
would not ask firms to alternately wear either of two hats—one 
as profit-seeker, the other as responsible citizen. It would 
collapse the dichotomies that are so pervasive in CSR 
literature—between private and public, between profit and 
charity, between the demands of business and the aspirations of 
politics. 
Corporations might engage in any number of such activities 
in developing countries. They might finance studies on the causes 
of particular forms of criminal conduct and develop innovative 
solutions. They might lobby for reforms in the host country that 
would increase, rather than decrease, enforcement. So too might 
they lobby their own jurisdiction to use the levers of 
international diplomacy to force other capital-exporting 
jurisdictions to enforce their extraterritorial prohibitions. All of 
these can be justified by a CSR model that recognizes 
corporations as responsible citizens. And all can be justified by 
an appeal to immediate profitability. A compliant U.S.-based 
multinational corporation doing business in Nigeria does not 
need a host of empirical studies to understand that if Nigeria 
enforced its own domestic bribery prohibitions, or China enforced 
its extraterritorial prohibition, the U.S. company would become 
more profitable. 
CSR is typically understood as a critique, either explicit or 
implicit, of neoclassical economics. It has sought to move beyond 
the Friedmanesque view of the firm, which has ―one and only one 
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage 
 
 54 See Spalding, supra note 33, at 10–15. 
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in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game.‖55  So too has the bulk of CSR 
literature asked firms to move beyond the motives typically 
attributed to the homo economicus of law and economics. Though 
it may well remain true that business engagement with social 
issues is ―generally attributed to two broad motivations, financial 
and political-institutional,‖ 56  these need not be mutually 
exclusive. To the extent that the CSR literature can collapse this 
dichotomy, it will do far more to command the attention of the 
corporations whose voluntary conduct the advocates wish to 
direct. And contemporary international business, where 
companies from diverse jurisdictions are competing in developing 
countries for business, now provides the catalyst. 
CONCLUSION 
The above model has shown how efforts to decrease overseas 
bribery may very well have the opposite result and increase 
levels of criminality. It has used bribery precisely because it is 
perhaps the best example today of U.S. law pursuing overseas 
deterrence. But the model would apply to any area of law in 
which overall deterrence was the policy goal but where global 
legal and economic conditions give rise to investor substitution. 
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has recently taken measures to 
restrict the extraterritorial application of federal law governing 
corporate conduct, 57  the trajectory of increasing globalization 
would suggest that efforts to regulate extraterritorial business 
conduct will tend to expand rather than retract. Should this 
happen, regulators and advocates alike will increasingly contend 
with these unique conditions. 
Ultimately, the deterrence theory of law and economics 
identifies a problem that it cannot solve. It must hand off the 
problem to another literature, with a different set of assumptions 
and goals, in the hopes that it may fashion a new remedy. CSR 
may very well be that literature. This essay calls upon it to move 
beyond the dichotomies that have simultaneously made CSR 
scholarship seem so inspiring to some and yet so futile to others. 
Indeed, applied to contemporary international business, CSR’s 
 
 55 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
 56 Levy & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 435. 
 57 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887–88 (2010) 
(restricting the application of Rule 10b-5 to domestic transactions); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (restricting the application of the Alien Tort 
Statute to conduct that ―touch[es] and concern[s] the territory of the United 
States . . . with sufficient force.‖). 
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goal may very well be to collapse the dichotomy between law and 
economics and CSR itself. 
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